Secure your AI agents and MCP servers

Agent stacks standardize tool schemas; they do not mint identity. If poll_headlines or write_ticket is implemented as "send a long-lived secret," every improvement to the agent increases the cost of a single leak from logs, prompt injection, or a compromised host. That is the market problem: ambient API keys and bearer tokens inside agent processes are reusable credentials, and agents mint them faster than humans ever did.

ENI6MA Gate (the enforcement component that sits between callers and a protected route) ships an MCP wrapper form factor that puts proof in front of tools that mutate state. The caller assembles an envelope (a one-time cryptographic authorization for a single request, replacing the reusable bearer token or API key). Control (the control plane: identity registry plus durable nonce ledger) records the nonce as spent under burn-before-validate (the ledger marks the nonce spent before the cryptographic proof is checked), so a captured tool call cannot be replayed even if validation later rejects it.

For a security architect, authentication can stay with your existing IdP or mTLS story. What changes is authorization for side-effecting tool calls. Multi-agent estates can issue per-agent circuits (compiled cryptographic identities minted by Foundry) so one compromised specialist does not inherit org-wide ambient authority.

What you would deploy

• Gate MCP wrapper on side-effecting tools (Demo today; evaluation path via the DEMO-HACK cloud host, client, and server tour).
• Hybrid circuits in agent mode for machine-to-machine tool callers that need post-quantum key agreement without changing the envelope contract.
• Control ledger with burn-before-validate so captured tool envelopes become fossils after one use.
• Optional Verify suite (a customer-runnable attack harness) to falsify replay and retarget before production cutover.