Demos · Pass+

Passwords, OTPs, and session cookies are still reusable the moment an attacker copies them. In about two minutes you can see why a human can prove they are themselves to a server without ever sending anything the server could reuse against them.

Ceremony demo

The widget below runs a small round of Pass+ (the human ceremony client that produces a request-bound proof without leaving a reusable secret behind, similar in spirit to how a hardware security key finishes a WebAuthn ceremony). Six public color zones sit on the page, and six private bearings (one of six directional choices a prover makes each round; bearings are consumed by observation and cannot be replayed) sit on the pad. For each round, the demo asks you to translate the highlighted zone through your private synonym map and press the matching bearing. You submit only bearings; the map itself never leaves your head, and observers see nothing that would let them replay your answers. After six witnesses the demo emits one deferred verdict.

Two things to notice for a threat model. First, a keylogger that records every click sees only bearings, and those bearings only make sense against the private map the human holds; recording the whole session gives the attacker no way to answer a new round. Second, the demo binds each session to a nonce and burns it before the verdict, so even a perfect recording of a good session cannot be replayed as a new login. The shipping ceremony does the same thing against a compiled twin (the per-identity binary a workload runs to prove itself, produced by the Foundry minting appliance) rather than against JavaScript on this page.